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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Item 28 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 17 July 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, H.E. Mr. László Kovács, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, concerning the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 28 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) István NÁTHON
Permanent Representative

* A/50/50/Rev.1.

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ANNEX

Statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Another humanitarian disaster is unfolding in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a consequence of the recent large-scale attack by the Bosnian Serbs, the United Nations-declared safe area of Srebrenica has fallen. Forty thousand civilian lives are now at risk. The situation in Zepa and Gorazde, two other safe areas, is also critical. The Dutch United Nations peace-keepers deployed in Srebrenica were forced to leave the town, together with thousands of fleeing civilians. A mere expression of outrage and condemnation is no longer enough.

The Bosnian Serb takeover of Srebrenica, the attacks launched against the civilian population and United Nations personnel there and in other safe areas, and the blockade of humanitarian deliveries to Sarajevo are elements of a larger, consistent pattern of Bosnian Serb repudiation of the United Nations and the international community as a whole, and of the rejection by Pale of all efforts at a peaceful settlement. With these actions, the Bosnian Serbs are sending a clear and defiant message to the world community. Those who are condoning, supporting or committing these unqualifiable actions, in blatant violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions, must be held accountable. The United Nations personnel detained by the Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenica must be immediately released. UNPROFOR's freedom of movement must be unconditionally ensured. The concept of safe areas has been fundamental to the United Nations presence in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was destined to be a means to provide security for the civilian populations there and to ensure their humanitarian support. It is worth recalling that events in Srebrenica were instrumental in the decision by the United Nations two years ago to introduce the very concept of safe areas in the country. Failure to provide protection to them and to stop yet another humanitarian tragedy raises the question of the viability of the entire concept. The international community should look for more adequate and efficient ways to ensure the continuation of its conflict-management activities in the former Yugoslavia as it seeks answers to some fundamental questions regarding its role and response to the unprecedented challenges stemming from this conflict. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe reiterates its readiness to continue to actively support all such efforts aimed at bringing peace and justice to this tormented region.

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SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 17 July 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia concerning the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the safe area of Srebrenica.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 28 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) RAZALI Ismail
Permanent Representative

* A/50/50/Rev.1.

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ANNEX

Statement on Srebrenica by the Honourable
Datuk Abdullah H. Ahmad Badawi, Minister
for Foreign Affairs

That the United Nations and NATO have abandoned Srebrenica to the Serbs, leaving the other enclaves exposed to greater threat, is a scandalous and outrageous act on their part.

Srebrenica has shown that the so-called United Nations safe areas are only safe for the aggressors to brutalize, kill, rape and destroy. The civilians, women and children are not protected but left entirely at the mercy of the Serbian terrorists. Where is the credibility of the United Nations and NATO?

Malaysia once again reiterates, in the strongest terms, its condemnation of this latest Serbian act of aggression. We call upon the United Nations Security Council and NATO, the most powerful alliance in the world, to stop the Serbs by the use of all available means, including military action and air strikes.

If the United Nations and the major Powers choose simply to stand aside with their hands tied and eyes closed, unwilling and hesitant to fulfil their mandate and responsibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina, let the Bosnian people exercise their inherent right of self-defence with the immediate lifting of the arms embargo and let them invite others who are prepared to save the Bosnian people and nation.

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17 July 1995

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LETTER DATED 14 JULY 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983 (1995) of 31 March 1995 and should like to inform you that Germany has offered to make available a field hospital for the United Nations peace-keeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

I therefore propose that Germany be added to the Member States authorized to contribute military personnel to the peace-keeping forces established by the above resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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17 July 1995
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LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1995 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter of 14 July 1995 (S/1995/585) regarding the addition of a new country to the list of Member States that contribute troops to the peace-keeping forces established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983 (1995) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council, who are in agreement with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Gerardo MARTINEZ BLANCO
President of the Security Council

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1995/587
17 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your kind attention, a letter from His Excellency Sayed Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan, in response to the letter addressed to you on 11 Judy 1995 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, regarding the Egyptian military aggression against the Sudanese province of Halaib.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Mohamed OSMAN YASSIN
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 17 July 1995 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 10 July 1995 addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt concerning Egypt's aggression against the Sudanese province of Halaib (S/1995/559, annex) and to the allegations, accusations and slander regarding so-called established facts and historical reality adduced in it. The letter contains many contradictions, lacks objectivity and avoids giving a direct reply to the two letters from Sudan to which it refers.

Likewise, it is clear that the author of the letter has a tendency to resort to provocative rhetoric and to repeat allegations that the Egyptian Government continues to make against the Sudan; these allegations have no factual basis and their only purpose is to rally neighbouring States in the region to the Egyptian cause. Although the international community is well aware that the violence that is rife in Egypt is linked to internal problems, Egypt is seeking to use this letter to divert international attention from this reality by unjustly accusing the Sudan of instigating such violence. The fact that the assassinations of the former President of Egypt and of the former chairman of the Egyptian Parliament have not yet been forgotten supports our contention that the recent history of Egypt is nothing more than a succession of internal violence.

I should like to inform the Security Council of the following facts:

1. The agreement concluded between the two parties in 1899 and amended in 1902 and 1907 provides that the Sudan has sovereignty over the territories and region of Halaib, which since then have remained fully under Sudanese sovereignty. The inhabitants of the region of Halaib participated, as Sudanese citizens, in the first elections to the Sudanese Parliament held in 1953 and in subsequent parliamentary elections; they have never taken part in any Egyptian election. There is a great deal of evidence and facts confirming the Sudan's sovereignty over the region of Halaib; we shall not adduce this information here. Egypt's attempts to alter the demographic structure of the region and expel its inhabitants by applying a policy of fait accompli will not give it legal or historical sovereignty over this Sudanese territory, especially after the decisive events that took place at the beginning of the conflict in the region.

2. Egypt's provocations and its concentration of troops in Sudanese territory in the region of Halaib became its characteristic way of dealing with the question as relations between the two countries worsened. Egypt had already resorted to such methods in 1958, which led the Sudan, in a note dated 20 February 1958, to bring the matter before the Security Council, which considered it at its 812th meeting on 21 February 1958 at exactly 3 p.m.

3. The Sudanese Government's persistence in turning to the Security Council stems from its wish to draw the Council's attention to the unjustified and irresponsible acts of aggression perpetrated by the Egyptian authorities, which are seeking to provoke the secession of a part of Sudanese territory in order to gain control of its resources and open up a new front in order to force the Sudan into a military confrontation that would threaten the stability, security and peace of the region.

4. The Sudanese Government has sought to examine and assess the exact incidents that confirm Egypt's continued aggression against Sudanese territory, while the Egyptian party has avoided addressing the root of the problem, namely, Egypt's repeated acts of aggression, preferring to resort to vituperations without any supporting evidence whatsoever. Moreover, the unjust accusation according to which the Sudan allegedly confiscated property of the Egyptian diplomatic mission was merely a pretext for preparing the cowardly attack on 16 July 1995 by the Egyptian services on four Sudanese diplomats from the embassy of the Sudan in Cairo, seriously wounding them and violating all international instruments, laws and practices currently in force, in particular the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, as well as General Assembly resolutions 42/154 and 49/49.

Egypt's professed wish to begin bilateral negotiations is belied by the Egyptian Government's acts and attitude; it is contradiction with the Sudan's repeated appeal to the Egyptian party to allow the joint commission on the question of Halaib to resume its work, since the Egyptian party has continued to evade the question and procrastinate, while at the same time engaging in acts of aggression against the Sudanese province of Halaib.

While it is sufficient for the Sudanese Government that the Halaib triangle is Sudanese territory from both a legal and historical standpoint, it declares once again that it is ready and determined to accept the principle of a settlement or international arbitration or even a ruling by the International Court of Justice concerning the dispute over Halaib, and requests the Security Council to compel Egypt to accept the principle of international arbitration and also to force it to agree to the following measures:

(a) Cessation of military concentrations in Sudanese territory;

(b) Complete withdrawal from the Sudanese province of Halaib and payment of appropriate compensation to the families of victims of Egyptian aggression;

(c) Renunciation of the policy of fait accompli and of expulsion of the Sudanese population from the region;

(d) Lifting of the blockade on the inhabitants of the region and authorization of deliveries to them of water and food, Egypt assuming responsibility for what could happen to them if this is not done.

Believing in good-neighbourly relations, relying on well-founded principles and firmly committed to the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolutions, the Sudan reaffirms its steadfast desire for security, peace and stability in the whole region.

(Signed) Ali Osman Mohamed TAHA
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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17 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 976 (1995) of 8 February 1995, in which the Council, inter alia, authorized the establishment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) with an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 and requested me to submit a complete report on the Mission and on the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex) by 15 July 1995. In keeping with my view that the activities of the United Nations should be considered as a whole and that the various programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the system can support in important ways the Organization's peacemaking and peace-keeping endeavours, I have included in the present report a section on the economic and social aspects of the United Nations effort in Angola.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Despite significant delays, the Angolan peace process has made steady progress since the adoption of Security Council resolution 976 (1995). The general atmosphere of mistrust between the Government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) is diminishing, particularly since the meeting in Lusaka on 6 May 1995 between the President of Angola, Mr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and the President of UNITA, Mr. Jonas Savimbi.

3. My Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, has continued his efforts to facilitate implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and to consolidate the cease-fire and the process of national reconciliation. With the active support of the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States of America), he has had frequent meetings with President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, as well as with other senior civilian and military officials from the Government and UNITA. He has had extensive discussions with the Heads of State of Namibia, South Africa, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

4. The members of the Joint Commission, the principal body that includes the three observer States and is charged with the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, have met regularly under the chairmanship of my Special Representative. They have also met with President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi.

5. Concerned by the slow pace of implementation of the Protocol, and as I reported to the Council, I sent my Special Adviser, Mr. Ismat Kittani, on a mission in March 1995 to make a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Angola. On the basis of his report, on 26 March I addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/230) in which I observed that, although there were certain risks involved, it would be in the best interest of the peace process to proceed with preparations for the deployment of the infantry units of UNAVEM III.

6. Since the meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi in Lusaka, high-level contacts between members of the Government and UNITA have intensified. On 25 May, the Government delegation to the Joint Commission travelled to Bailundo, where the UNITA headquarters is currently located, to deliver a message to Mr. Savimbi from President dos Santos. In addition, President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi have been in regular contact by telephone. My Special Representative came to Headquarters for consultations on 8 June and briefed the Security Council on these and other developments relating to the peace process.

7. On 16 June, the Central Committee of the ruling Movimento Popular para a Libertacão de Angola (MPLA) offered Mr. Savimbi one of two positions of Vice-President, with the other to be held by a senior member of MPLA. If such posts were to be created, the Constitution of Angola would have to be amended and the prerogatives of the two posts carefully defined.

8. In late June, a high-level UNITA delegation visited Luanda to review with the Government the practical modalities for accelerating the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The review culminated in a comprehensive working document signed by the two parties and submitted to the Joint Commission. The document is currently being reviewed by UNAVEM and the three observer States for submission to the Joint Commission for adoption.

9. In order to review the progress made so far and to assess the situation on the ground, I visited Angola from 14 to 16 July. During my visit, I discussed with the Government and UNITA ways and means of expediting the implementation of the peace process and consolidating the efforts to bring about lasting peace and reconciliation in Angola. I also reviewed with the parties the reconstruction needs of the country in order to make an appeal to the international community at a round-table meeting scheduled to be held in September.

10. During my visit, I met with President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, both of whom committed themselves to support the peace process in order to make it irreversible. I shall inform the Security Council of my impressions soon after my return to New York.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Observance of the cease-fire

11. The deployment of United Nations military and police observers throughout the country since the adoption of resolution 976 (1995) and the gradual induction of formed units have contributed to improved respect for the cease-fire.

12. The same number of cease-fire violations were recorded in May and June (137 each). These violations were recorded in particular in northern parts of the provinces of Huila, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malange, Moxico and Zaire. All incidents have been investigated by UNAVEM, but the Mission has not so far reported a major breach of the peace. Some incidents may be attributable to delays in the disengagement of troops, local attempts to regain territory, increased acts of banditry and lack of troop discipline or to the establishment by UNAVEM of more effective verification mechanisms. In many places, the population continues to complain about harassment and extortion at checkpoints. The following are the monthly figures of cease-fire violations, including unauthorized troop movements, reported since the beginning of this year: January, 157; February, 139; March, 235; April, 129; May, 137; June, 137. These numbers indicate that there is still room for improvement.

B. Disengagement and demining

13. Progress continues to be slow in troop disengagement, demining and the establishment of quartering areas. Until recently, UNITA insisted that no further disengagement of troops should take place until the Government withdrew from the areas it had reoccupied in the provinces of Huambo and Uige. However, the two parties have now agreed to keep their troops *in situ* until UNITA troops move to quartering areas and government troops move to barracks. At the same time, substantial improvement has been registered in the establishment of triangular communications between the Angolan parties and UNAVEM III. UNAVEM liaison with the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) and UNITA troops on the ground has remained satisfactory, but it would be helpful if liaison officers of both sides were located at UNAVEM regional headquarters. The Mission is also trying to monitor closely the conscription and training of new military personnel by the parties, as this could have implications for the planned integration of their armed forces.

14. As I stressed in previous reports to the Council, the demining and rehabilitation of major routes is a vital task that will affect almost every aspect of the peace process (deployment of United Nations troops, free circulation of people, extension of the central administration, quartering of troops, etc.). After unfortunate delays, the Government and UNITA have begun essential demining activities throughout the country, with the cooperation of UNAVEM, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While some mine-clearing equipment has been procured by the Government, a great deal more is needed. Notwithstanding recent efforts, the pace of mine clearance has remained slow. In the meantime, mines continue to be a major hazard for the Angolan population and UNAVEM and

humanitarian personnel. On 16 June, a United Nations military observer on patrol detonated an anti-personnel mine and sustained a very serious injury, while a second military observer was slightly wounded. In this connection, allegations about renewed laying of mines in some parts of the country are particularly disturbing and UNAVEM has called on the Angolan parties to put an immediate and definitive end to this practice. Equally vital was the initiation by the Government of the reconstruction of bridges; the effects of this are already being felt in some parts of the country.

15. The timely establishment of quartering areas for the demobilization of UNITA troops, the withdrawal of the Angolan rapid reaction police and FAA troops to their barracks and strengthening of the logistic infrastructure for the unified national army will be of crucial importance for the success of the peace process. UNAVEM, together with UCAH and the humanitarian agencies concerned, has conducted a thorough reconnaissance of most of the designated areas. A strenuous effort is under way to establish at least 4 of the planned 14 such sites within the next few weeks in the strategically important Northern and Central regions. While UNAVEM, in cooperation with humanitarian agencies, will supply the materials, UNITA is expected to provide the personnel to construct facilities in the quartering areas. The United Nations is also requesting assistance from certain Member States, including those in the region and the two parties are being urged to finalize the plans for the quartering exercise.

C. Efforts by the parties towards implementation of the Lusaka Protocol

16. In a very promising development, high-level government and UNITA delegations met in Luanda from 19 June to 1 July to discuss several crucial issues concerning implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The agenda of these intensive talks included the following issues: quartering of UNITA forces; return of FAA to barracks; incorporation of UNITA troops into the national armed forces; reopening of roads and free circulation of people and goods; disarmament of the civilian population; repatriation of mercenaries; clarification of the amnesty law; and preparations for further high-level meetings in Luanda. Decisions were reached on most of these questions and the parties approved a timetable to make up for the delays that have occurred so far. They agreed on almost all quartering locations and the sequence of the quartering process, on basic conditions for assembly areas, on the modalities of the FAA withdrawal to barracks and on the need to eliminate checkpoints and organize additional humanitarian road convoys to formerly inaccessible areas. However, certain aspects, e.g. the incorporation of UNITA troops with FAA, require further consideration, and the two delegations were to meet again in Luanda on 11 July.

D. UNAVEM deployment and strength

17. As of 4 July, in addition to the 6 regional headquarters, 337 military observers of UNAVEM have been deployed to 55 sites throughout Angola; deployment in five new sites will commence soon. The recent arrival of a helicopter unit will accelerate the establishment of new observation sites and has greatly increased the Mission's capability to deliver supplies and carry out medical

evacuations. Deployment of United Nations formed units, whose total strength has reached 1,970 personnel (see annex 1), is generally proceeding in accordance with the adjusted time-frame set out in my previous report. Elements of the Uruguayan battalion and the Indian engineer squadron have reached Huambo overland and established their headquarters there; at least two more United Nations infantry battalions, from India and Zimbabwe, will be deployed to Angola in July and the one from Romania in mid-August. The United Kingdom logistics battalion, in conjunction with the administrative services of UNAVEM, has developed a third-line base infrastructure at Lobito and Viana. After the withdrawal of this unit in August, logistic requirements will be provided through a combination of contractual arrangements and a logistic company from another current troop contributor. In a previous report, the Council was informed of problems encountered when a potential troop contributor withdrew its earlier pledge; fortunately, a replacement has been found and the arrival of its troops has been incorporated into the induction schedule. At the same time, delays on the part of some troop contributors in deploying their troops to Angola continue to have adverse effects on this carefully planned operation.

18. Concern for the security of United Nations personnel was underscored by an incident on 9 June when a UNAVEM patrol was ambushed by unidentified gunmen in uniform and a United Nations military observer sustained serious injury. UNAVEM strongly condemned this incident and demanded that the Government and UNITA respect the safety and security of all United Nations staff in Angola.

IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

19. The civilian police component (CIVPOL), which was authorized by Security Council resolution 976 (1995), has proved to be an indispensable element in UNAVEM's efforts to implement the Lusaka Protocol. As of 4 July, 209 civilian police observers from 19 countries had been deployed to 29 teamsites throughout Angola, including most provincial capitals. An additional 51 police observers are expected to be inducted by September, which would bring the strength of the component to the authorized level of 260 personnel. CIVPOL deployment, in particular to remote parts of Angola, has been hindered by very bad road conditions and mines. However, efforts are being made to monitor as many national police units as possible.

20. CIVPOL continued to pursue actively its tasks as set out in my report of 1 February (S/1995/97) and in my most recent progress report (S/1995/458). It reports that the situation in most of the country is fairly calm and complaints about the conduct of the national police have been relatively few. However, despite the improving level of cooperation, the United Nations is often denied access to important information regarding the Angolan national police units, the strength and deployment of the rapid reaction police and the military equipment in its possession. Local Angolan national police authorities have also been reluctant to allow frequent visits to Angolan national police and rapid reaction police units. Notwithstanding the progress since February in facilitating the circulation of people, numerous checkpoints remain on the roads in some government and UNITA-controlled areas.

21. As provided in the Lusaka Protocol, the disarmament of the civilian population is to be done by the Angolan national police and monitored and verified by the United Nations. With the proliferation of weapons and the increase in banditry, it is imperative that the disarmament programme begin without further delay.

22. The Angolan parties have been registering complaints about human rights violations with my Special Representative and with the Joint Commission. In response to these complaints, and in accordance with the provisions of resolution 976 (1995), UNAVEM established a small sub-unit to deal with human rights issues and observe implementation of the relevant provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. Pending approval by the General Assembly of the full budget of UNAVEM III and the establishment of the necessary posts, five human rights specialists from Denmark, France and Portugal were temporarily placed at UNAVEM's disposal by the European Union. The work of these experts, who have been deployed to several regions, has proved very useful, and it is my intention to increase the strength of this unit by up to 11 personnel so that a human rights monitor can be stationed in almost all the 18 provinces of Angola. This will contribute to the civil education campaign and help to build confidence in the peace process. Should the Security Council agree, resources for this increase will be included in my next submission to the General Assembly on the financing of UNAVEM III.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

23. Despite formidable difficulties, the humanitarian situation in Angola has continued to improve since February 1995, as a direct result of the peace process and the expanded presence of the United Nations in the country.

24. In addition to their psychological impact, the road convoys led by my Special Representative from Luanda to Lobito and from Uige to Negage have facilitated humanitarian activities by making new areas accessible by road and reducing the need for costly deliveries by air. Thus, for the first time since 1992, the World Food Programme (WFP) was able in June to dispatch road convoys from Lobito to Sumbe and from Lobito to Huambo and Kuito. Varying degrees of progress have also been achieved in opening the Kuito-Menongue, Luanda-Malange and Lobito-Lubango routes. However, incidents on these and other vital roads, some of which have resulted in civilian casualties, call for resolute action by the Government and UNITA to ensure the safe passage of humanitarian supplies throughout the country.

25. The Humanitarian Coordination Group, which is co-chaired by the Minister of Social Affairs and the UCAH Director and includes representatives of UNITA, United Nations agencies, the observer and donor countries, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs, meets in Luanda on a weekly basis. Its meeting on 14 June, the first to be held outside Luanda, was convened in Bailundo, with strong UNITA representation. This event marked an important step towards building confidence and facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance. Another significant development in humanitarian cooperation was the initiation of plans for the resettlement of some 40,000 displaced persons residing in Jamba, whom UNITA had requested the Angolan Government and the

United Nations to help to return to their places of origin and reintegrate themselves into their communities.

26. Since the adoption of resolution 976 (1995) in February, the humanitarian programme has continued to expand. Recent assessment missions have found severe deficiencies in health services, clothing and basic food items in some regions. At the same time, progress has been made in launching joint humanitarian initiatives in areas currently under the control of both parties, in which government agencies, UNITA and the United Nations are now working together. At the end of May, staff of the Angolan Ministry of Health and UNICEF conducted vaccination programmes in Cuemba, Bié province, and in Mavinga, Kwando Kubango province. Similar joint activities are planned for other areas. In the meantime, significant spontaneous movement of internally displaced persons to their places of origin have been recorded in the provinces of Bengo, Benguela and Kwanza Norte. A workshop for representatives of the Government, UNITA, United Nations agencies and NGOs was held in Luanda from 22 to 24 June to develop a standard strategy for providing assistance to internally displaced persons. In June, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees appealed for US$ 44 million to fund the repatriation of 300,000 Angolan refugees currently residing in neighbouring countries.

27. The demobilization and reintegration section of the United Nations humanitarian appeal for Angola, which was issued in January 1995, has been readjusted in view of recent agreements between the parties. The revised demobilization and reintegration programme will require funding amounting to US$ 92.9 million, of which US$ 48.1 million will be needed for the first and crucial phase (i.e., the quartering of UNITA soldiers) and US$ 44.8 million for subsequent phases.

28. Prior experience with demobilization in Angola and elsewhere indicates that a comprehensive strategy and the timely and coordinated provision of donor funding will be indispensable for the success of this exercise. Now that the requisite strategy for Angola has been elaborated, it is critical to secure the necessary funds, in addition to other resources that will be appropriated through UNAVEM III's budget.

VI. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

29. The economic and social situation in Angola continues to be extremely precarious, owing mainly to the devastating effects of several decades of civil conflict. The following data reflect the enormous difficulties facing Angola during this period of transition: up to 70 per cent of the basic health system has been destroyed; only 18 per cent of the population has access to sanitation and 34 per cent to safe water; the infant mortality rate is 195 per 1,000; the food deficit in 1995 is expected to be approximately 360,000 tons; approximately 70,000 people have been mutilated by weapons and/or mines; 1.2 million internally displaced persons, 300,000 refugees in neighbouring countries and 3.2 million other people are in need of emergency humanitarian assistance. The debt/export ratio of the country has reached 365 per cent, and the estimated gross domestic product per capita has fallen to US$ 410, which represents half that of 1990. Military spending in 1994 was estimated to be 39 per cent of the

State budget, while the inflation rate was 1,838 per cent in 1993 and 972 per cent in 1994.

30. Faced with many challenges in the long-term social and economic development of Angola, United Nations programmes and agencies, in cooperation with NGOs, continue to play an important role in preparing for the demobilization and reintegration programme under the overall coordination of UCAH. Their activities will include counselling and referral services, establishing a trust fund for quick-impact projects and capacity-building for national institutions (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)); provision of health services in the quartering areas (World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)); strengthening of the national health system and combating diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis and trypanosomiasis (WHO); food-for-peace and food-for-work programmes (WFP); and vocational training, employment activities and artisanal kits (International Labour Organization). UNICEF and UNDP are supporting the demining programme through assistance to mine-awareness programmes, while UNDP will also assist in the development of a national mine action capacity. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continues to provide relief assistance in areas with large concentrations of returnees and refugees.

31. As the peace process advances, the focus of international assistance will gradually shift from emergency relief to rehabilitation and the reintegration of internally displaced persons, refugees and demobilized ex-combatants. It is important to ensure that the existing coordination mechanisms that manage the relief phase are transformed in due course into an effective structure for rehabilitation and development. This approach will require considerable capacity-building in the next few years and, to a certain extent, a "retooling" of the United Nations system on the ground in order to adapt to new circumstances. This process has already begun, and I expect to see tangible progress in this area. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the effectiveness and scope of United Nations development activities will depend on the progress made in the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. Major adjustments will be required in government budgetary priorities, accompanied by radical economic and social reforms.

32. On the strength of some positive developments in economic reform and in the peace process, the World Bank is developing plans to support Angola's reconstruction efforts. This enhanced support will include financing for emergency reconstruction and structural adjustment programmes, as well as a fund to support community-based initiatives for the rehabilitation of social infrastructure and income-generating activities. In addition, with the participation of United Nations agencies, a debt strategy for Angola is being prepared, as are programmes for the divestiture of public companies and streamlining of public services.

33. The Government of Angola, with support from UNDP and my Special Representative, has organized a round table for rehabilitation and community development, to be held in September 1995. The round-table programme, which will require up to US$ 620 million to implement, will also serve as the overall reference point for United Nations agencies. It contains detailed rehabilitation plans for all provinces with a focus on small-scale

infrastructure projects capable of delivering direct and immediate benefits to millions of people. In view of the many problems affecting the Angolan administrative apparatus, United Nations agencies are prepared to assist in strengthening national capacity for coordinating assistance. In this context, the United Nations system intends to accelerate its discussions with the Government concerning joint programming; a detailed time-table for this process is expected to be elaborated in the second half of 1995, depending on progress achieved in the peace process.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

34. As indicated in my report of 6 June 1995 on the financing of UNAVEM III (A/49/433/Add.1) which was submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration, the cost of maintaining the Mission beyond 8 August 1995 is estimated at US$ 25,032,100 gross per month. Should the Security Council decide to extend the Mission's mandate as recommended in paragraph 40 below, the cost of maintaining UNAVEM III during the extension period will be within the monthly rate indicated above.

35. As of 30 June 1995, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM special account since the inception of the Mission amounted to US$ 7.2 million. In order to meet the operating cash requirements of UNAVEM II and the start-up costs of UNAVEM III, loans amounting to US$ 15 million were made to the UNAVEM special account from the Peace-keeping Reserve Fund. These loans remain unpaid. The total unpaid contributions to all peace-keeping operations as of 30 June 1995 totalled US$ 1,788.9 million.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

36. Since the adoption of resolution 976 (1995) last February, the beneficial effects of United Nations involvement in the settlement of the Angolan conflict have become manifest. The progressive deployment of United Nations military and police observers and troops has helped to consolidate the cease-fire. Despite occasional military tensions and incidents, the Government and UNITA have been adhering to the spirit of the Lusaka Protocol.

37. Since the meeting on 6 May between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, the peace process has entered an encouraging new phase. Increased contacts between the Government and UNITA, and in particular their recent bilateral meetings in Luanda on political and military matters, give grounds for hope that the most difficult stage of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol might now be over. I welcome the agreement reached between the two parties on the adjusted and accelerated timetable for the implementation of the Protocol, the practical modalities of which are now being discussed with my Special Representative. I trust that all concerned, including the United Nations, will be able to arrive at workable solutions to the challenges presented by the new schedule. There can be no doubt that the continuing good will and resources of the international community will depend on sustained progress in the peace process.

38. Of the most pressing tasks that lie ahead, many have been highlighted in the adjusted implementation plan. At the same time, a comprehensive, fair and workable programme for the formation of the new armed forces should be adopted without further delay. As soon as that is done, it will be important to inform and prepare all Government and UNITA troops accordingly. It is also essential to accelerate the exchange of prisoners and the repatriation of mercenaries, to reinforce the freedom of movement of people throughout the country and to speed up demining activities. Equally, bold decisions in the area of national reconciliation would strengthen prospects for a durable peace.

39. Humanitarian assistance plays an important role in consolidating the Angolan peace process, especially in the demobilization and reintegration exercise, which will rely largely on external resources to support the demobilized UNITA troops and their dependants. Although many donors have expressed interest, less than 1 per cent of the voluntary funds sought for this purpose under the 1995 humanitarian appeal has been contributed to date. Now that the promising events of the last two months have improved the prospects for an early start to quartering and demobilization, I very much hope that donors will respond with generous and timely financial contributions to the humanitarian effort. Equally, I appeal to Member States to provide much-needed mine clearance, bridging and road repair equipment and materials and other supplies necessary for setting up the quartering areas.

40. In these more encouraging circumstances, I recommend that the mandate of UNAVEM III be extended for a period of six months, that is until 8 February 1996. In order to keep the Security Council fully informed of developments, I intend to submit a comprehensive report every two months. In addition, as stated in paragraph 10 above, I shall convey to the Council my observations and any recommendations I may have subsequent to my visit of 14 to 16 July to Angola.

41. In the meantime, I would again like to pay tribute to my Special Representative and to all the military, police and civilian staff of UNAVEM III for the continued dedication and perseverance with which they discharge their duties, as well as to the personnel of the United Nations programmes and agencies and NGOs for their humanitarian efforts in the difficult conditions prevailing in Angola.

Annex

UNAVEM III military and civilian police personnel
(as of 4 July 1995)

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff Officers	Troops	Total
Algeria	10				10
Argentina	2	1			3
Bangladesh	10	11	21		42
Brazil	30 a/	17			47
Bulgaria	10	10			20
Congo	8				8
Egypt	10	10			20
Fiji		10			10
France	8				8
Guinea-Bissau	20	6			26
Hungary	10	13			23
India	19	19	49	214	301
Jordan	21	20			41
Kenya	10				10
Malaysia	20	20			40
Mali	10	10			20
Morocco		2			2
Netherlands	15	9			24
New Zealand	6				6
Nigeria	21	15			36
Pakistan	5				5
Norway	4				4
Poland	7				7
Portugal	8	1	20	101	130
Romania			27	110	137
Russian Federation	10			158	168
Senegal	10				10
Slovakia	5				5
Sweden	18				18
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland			8	588	596
Uruguay	10	9	37	799	855
Zambia	10	9			19
Zimbabwe	21	17	35		73
Total	348 a/	209	197	1 970	2 724

a/ Including 11 medical personnel.



Map No. 3881 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS
July 1995

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Cartographic Section

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/1995/589
18 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF EGYPT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter addressed to you from His Excellency Amre Moussa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the enclosed letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nabil ELARABY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to the bloody events taking place in Bosnia at the present time - events that have been of such proportions as to go beyond all bounds acceptable to human conscience - I should like to submit to you the points set forth hereunder. The Egyptian Government feels that it has become necessary for the Security Council, in conformity with the responsibility entrusted to it under the Charter of the United Nations, to consider these points in all earnestness and in an expeditious manner so that immediate and workable measures may be devised with a view to bringing an end to a deteriorating situation that portends developments whose dire consequences we must all cooperate in preventing.

1. A lack of commitment to the full implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and a failure to accord such resolutions the respect they require by giving them immediate and impartial effect have been among the causes of the ongoing savage Serbian assault on the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the abandonment of their inhabitants to the odious policy of ethnic cleansing and the contempt expressed for the United Nations and the peace-keeping forces under its flag.

2. The protection of the safe areas in Bosnia is a responsibility that falls directly on the Security Council under the terms of resolution 836 (1993), in which the Council explicitly extends the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia in order to enable it to protect these areas. The Organization has not, however, provided the forces in question with the necessary manpower or equipment to perform the tasks assigned to them in the proper manner. This is despite the readiness expressed by many States Members of the United Nations, including Egypt, within this framework.

3. That the safe areas in Bosnia have fallen in this manner and in spite of the assurances given by the Council deprives the Organization of credibility in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council must embark immediately on the adoption of effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to end the dangerous and unlawful situation of the safe areas, to bring about the complete withdrawal from these areas of the attacking forces and the safe return of the civilians displaced and to ensure that such persons are compensated for the damage caused to them and to their property.

4. It has also become necessary for the Security Council to take immediate steps to halt the Serbian encroachment on these areas and to provide the necessary protection to the United Nations forces in Bosnia in order to enable them to meet their responsibilities in the best and most effective manner.

5. The failures of the international community in providing protection to the people of Bosnia, in halting policies of ethnic cleansing, as constituting a war

crime and a crime against humanity, and in ending the deliberate obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance mean that we must reconsider the maintenance of the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia with a view to enabling its people to exercise its legitimate right to self-defence.

We call upon the Security Council, under your chairmanship, to adopt a frank and objective stance on what is currently happening in Bosnia. I am certain that a serious commitment on the part of the Council to rectifying the currently worsening situation will once more open the way to restoring their lost effectiveness to the Organization and to the Council's resolutions on the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(Signed) Amre MOUSSA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Arab Republic of Egypt

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A/50/295
S/1995/590
18 July 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Item 28 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 17 July 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, dated 15 July 1995, concerning the recent deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 28 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anatoli M. ZLENKO
Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to the United Nations

* A/50/50/Rev.1.

95-21501 (E) 180795 190795

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Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Ukraine is seriously concerned at the escalation of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Heedless of human pain and suffering, the parties to the conflict are being drawn deeper and deeper into a full-scale war, with unforeseeable consequences.

The hostilities are accompanied by acts of violence against the civilian population. The infamous practice of ethnic cleansing, in particular the deportation of Muslims from the eastern enclaves of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is becoming more widespread.

Ukraine is particularly alarmed at the hostile acts committed by the parties to the conflict against United Nations peace-keeping personnel, especially in the "safe areas" of Žepa and Goražde, where a Ukrainian contingent is deployed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers the threats against and humiliation of United Nations troops and their use as living shields completely unacceptable. The language of ultimatums to which the sides are resorting with increasing frequency in their dealings with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) is inadmissible.

Ukraine believes that the attainment of peace in the region depends primarily on the belligerent sides themselves. Without their political will, no peacemaking efforts will be able to prevent an escalation of violence.

The development of the conflict in the territory of Yugoslavia has clearly demonstrated that reliance on military might and attempts to dictate conditions for peace by force of arms are doomed to failure. Only direct dialogue between the parties to the conflict, with the mediation of the United Nations, is the quickest way of halting the bloodshed and achieving peace.

In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine proposes that a meeting of the Security Council at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs be convened as soon as possible in order to conduct a comprehensive review of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and adopt effective decisions with a view to promoting a resumption of the dialogue and finding a formula for reconciliation that would be acceptable to all parties to the conflict.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has sent letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council requesting them to take immediate steps to ensure the safety of the Ukrainian and other peace-keeping contingents.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine are taking other necessary measures with a view to normalizing the situation.

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S/1995/591
19 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two notes dated 6 and 11 July 1995, respectively, from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the Office of the Government of the Republic of Croatia in Belgrade.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bratislav DJORDJEVIC
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

95-21588 (E) 190795 200795

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Annex I

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia presents it compliments to the Office of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and strongly protests the shelling of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia on 4 July 1995.

On the said date, the Croatian Army opened fire from the Dubravka area (Pelinovo Brdo, Prapratno) on two occasions between 9.32 p.m. and 9.40 p.m. and between 10.15 p.m. and 10.25 p.m. with the 20-mm anti-aircraft guns at the positions of the Yugoslav border near Greda, Kumbor garrison, in the region of Boka Kotorska. The Army of Yugoslavia did not return fire.

This gross and unprovoked provocation of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia constitutes a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, threatens the security of its citizens and causes additional tension in the border area.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemns most strongly this latest brazen provocation of the Croatian armed forces and warns of the danger and possible consequences of such acts, for which the Croatian side will be held responsible.

Annex II

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia presents its compliments to the Office of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and strongly protests the repeated shelling of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia on 9 July 1995.

At 6.45 p.m. on the said date, the Army of the Republic of Croatia opened anti-aircraft machine-gun fire against the positions of the Army of Yugoslavia near Greda in the region of Boka Kotorska. On that occasion, eight shells were fired from the Pelinovo Brdo position and six sniper bullets from point 611 at the observation post of the Army of Yugoslavia. The Army of Yugoslavia did not return fire.

This, the latest in the series of gross and unprovoked provocations of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia, is yet another example of the flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, threatens the security of its citizens and causes additional tension in the border area.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemns most strongly this latest brazen provocation of the Croatian armed forces and warns of the danger and possible consequences of such acts, for which the Croatian side will be held responsible.

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Security Council

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S/1995/592
19 July 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter of 6 July 1995 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Kuwait (S/1995/546), another in the series of the letters he submits on the approach of each review by the Security Council of the sanctions imposed on Iraq. I should like to state that, like its predecessors, this letter contains sophistries and groundless charges and that its objective, as is obvious, is to exert influence on the Security Council and delay the Council's decision to mitigate or lift the comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iraq five years ago.

So that you, the members of the Security Council and the international community as a whole may be made aware of the falsity of the allegations made in the Kuwaiti letter, we should like to set forth hereunder a number of facts and considerations.

I. MISSING PERSONS

In the Kuwaiti letter, the writer claims to be proceeding on the basis of a humanitarian view of the issue of the missing persons. However, the substance of the letter and the timing of its submission reveal the true state of affairs, namely that it is aimed at securing political objectives. The letter further claims that the relevant Iraqi authorities are not cooperating with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and that it is this that has caused the lack of any substantive progress with regard to the missing persons issue. This allegation is refuted by the following facts and considerations:

1. The matter of the missing persons is being handled through the investigation of the individual dossiers submitted and under the supervision of the tripartite committee consisting of Iraq, as one party, and the coalition States (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States), as a second party, and with ICRC acting as chairman.

With regard to its actions in this matter, Iraq emphasizes four major principles, namely:

(a) Commitment to investigation in accordance with ICRC norms and practices;

(b) Cooperation with ICRC in its capacity as an impartial intermediary for the settlement of this humanitarian issue;

(c) Adherence to the rules of confidentiality and the avoidance of politicization;

(d) Cooperative and joint action with a view to arriving at a rational determination of the fate of the persons claimed to be missing on the basis of information of reasonable credibility.

Iraq has constantly affirmed its position with respect to continued action with a view to closing the file on this issue for humanitarian reasons, in accordance with the principles stated above, and it has no political interest of any kind in its prolongation.

2. Since June 1994 Iraq has continued to participate in the periodic meetings of the tripartite committee. As of the date of writing, it has submitted preliminary replies on 230 dossiers, and these replies have been communicated to the Kuwaiti authorities through ICRC.

3. On 8 December 1994 the tripartite committee formed a technical subcommittee to undertake the detailed technical work relating to investigations and inquiries concerning missing persons. The subcommittee was established on the understanding that it would hold its meetings in a country of the region, rather than at Geneva, in order to facilitate contacts between the authorities of the parties concerned, to assist in promoting a climate of confidence and to ensure the confidentiality required by the nature of the task. It was agreed that the subcommittee would hold monthly meetings and that it would submit regular reports on the progress made in its work to the tripartite committee. An understanding was also reached that the subcommittee would hold six meetings in the hope of thereby achieving substantive results to be referred to the tripartite committee for evaluation.

4. The original number of dossiers submitted on missing Kuwaitis and foreigners was 627. The efforts described hereunder reduced this number to 605. At the meeting of the tripartite committee held at Geneva on 7 April 1995, ICRC announced that the technical subcommittee had processed 168 dossiers at the three meetings it had held at Geneva in the first three months of the year.

5. The results thus far obtained by the relevant authorities in Iraq are as follows:

(a) It was discovered that 36 dossiers contained duplicate names and pertained to only 18 cases. Thus, 18 dossiers were subtracted from the original number.

(b) The remains of one missing person, Masfar Saqr Mahdi al-Matiri, were returned to the Kuwaiti authorities on 11 December 1994 under ICRC supervision. The relevant Iraqi authorities replied to all the questions relating to the

deceased addressed to them by the Kuwaiti authorities concerned. The Kuwaiti authorities nevertheless allege that they are not able to ascertain that the remains are those of the person in question. They have not thus far agreed to close the case and neither have they made any proposals with a view to doing so. In the meetings of the technical subcommittee the Kuwaiti authorities are insisting on their claim that the deceased is still imprisoned in Iraq.

(c) The relevant Iraqi authorities notified the Kuwaiti side that the Kuwaiti national Jamal Muhammad Sulayman al-Huli had died in detention after contracting a kidney disease. His personal identification papers were handed over to the Kuwaiti side at the meeting of the technical subcommittee held at Geneva on 23 February 1995. Subsequently, the Iraqi side submitted a map showing the approximate location where the deceased had been buried in Kuwait and then provided information based on memory that included a description of the place of burial. According to the record of the meeting of the technical subcommittee held on 30 March 1995, the Kuwaiti side promised to provide a precise map of the area so that the Iraqi side could use it to give an accurate indication of the place of burial. Kuwait has yet to produce this map, to provide any information on developments in the search for the body or to indicate whether or not the body has been found.

(d) The relevant Iraqi authorities recently traced the Kuwaiti national Nadiyah Muhammad Shatit al-Anazi, in whose name the Kuwaitis had submitted a dossier claiming that she was in detention in Iraq. This woman was found to be living in Baghdad, and she stated that she had left Kuwait for Iraq of her own free will and that she wished to remain in the country. The ICRC delegation in Baghdad was notified of her situation. Thus far, the delegation has questioned her alone on three separate occasions in order to assess her situation and resolve it in accordance with ICRC operating procedures.

6. Kuwait has not dealt in a serious manner with the preliminary replies provided by Iraq concerning many of the dossiers or with the questions asked and the requests for clarification and additional information made by Iraq in connection with some of them, while the provision of such information by Kuwait would certainly facilitate a serious investigation into the fate of the missing persons in question.

In almost all cases, Kuwait has resorted to pro forma answers of the type:

"Iraq is holding Kuwaitis with or without reason";

"The Iraqi authorities are responsible for the safety of detainees";

"The Iraqi registers are not to be trusted";

"Iraqi officials are not doing their duty as they should and are failing to record the names of missing persons in their registers";

"The witnesses to the shooting incident near the Holiday Inn in Kuwait City [an incident that is relevant to the cases of some of the missing persons] have left Kuwait".

Kuwait has also refused to give Iraq any explanation of the reasons for its requests that two files be closed and that the consideration of two others be suspended. Iraq has asked for clarification of these requests because of the possibility that the information available to Kuwait on the two persons in question might help to shed light on the investigation of other dossiers.

7. The Kuwaiti authorities have persistently thwarted the work of the technical subcommittee. At the outset, they prevented the implementation of the tripartite committee's decision that the meetings of the technical subcommittee should be held in the region, so that its first three meetings of 1995 were held at Geneva. Iraq nevertheless attended these three meetings and called attention to the breach of the tripartite committee's decision. In deference to the wishes of the coalition parties, Kuwait's partners in the committee, Kuwait agreed that the meetings of the subcommittee should be held in the region provided that they would be moved to its territory alone at a subsequent stage. Iraq did not agree to this proposal as lacking in balance. After consultation with ICRC, Iraq proposed that, in accordance with one of the committee's objectives, namely the development of a climate of confidence between the two sides, sessions of the subcommittee should be held alternately in Kuwaiti territory and Iraqi territory. The efforts of ICRC were successful and it was agreed that the session of the technical subcommittee scheduled for the end of May 1995 should be held in the Iraq-Kuwait border zone and should be preceded by a preparatory meeting at the beginning of the same month in the same location. The names of the members of the delegations of the two countries to the preparatory meeting were exchanged. At the last moment, however, Kuwait declined to attend the preparatory meeting without giving any justification for its decision.

ICRC thereupon resumed its efforts to arrange further meetings of the technical subcommittee. Kuwait agreed that on 17 June 1995 a delegation of the two sides should make an inspection tour of the facilities at the two sites, one on each side of the boundary line, at which the meetings of the technical subcommittee would be held, namely Camp Khawr on the Kuwaiti side and Umm Qasr on the Iraqi side.

Agreement was reached that the members of the two delegations should be granted entry visas, the representatives of Iraq at the Kuwaiti border station at Abdali and the representatives of Kuwait at the Iraqi border station at Safwan. The two border stations are situated on the expressway linking Kuwait City and Basra, and they are some 300 metres apart. The Iraqi delegation thus left for Basra on 16 June 1995 accompanied by representatives of ICRC in Baghdad. On the evening of the same day, the members of the Kuwaiti delegation informed ICRC that they wished on the following day to come directly to the Umm Qasr location, because they did not want to traverse the distance of 28 kilometres to the Iraqi Safwan border station to have their passports stamped there. The Iraqi side did not agree to this sudden change of plans for one simple technical reason, namely that Umm Qasr is not a border station and there are no competent border authorities present there to undertake the procedures required for recording border crossings and stamping passports. The Kuwaitis thus again thwarted the holding of the meeting. The tripartite committee will meet again on 3 and 4 August 1995 and will discuss this matter once more.

8. Having succeeded in preventing the technical subcommittee from meeting in the region, Kuwait began to call insistently for an end to its operations on the grounds that it had failed to fulfil its mandate. The reason for this position is not difficult to grasp. The technical character of the work of the subcommittee requires the parties to work together and a true readiness for joint action on all aspects of the information generated in the course of investigation so that, for humanitarian reasons, the issue may be brought to a close. Such a method of proceeding does not appeal to the Kuwaiti side, because it does not provide a forum in which charges can be levelled without commitment to serious participation in a substantive effort. It appears certain that Kuwait has reached the conclusion that the work of the technical subcommittee will not serve its political objectives as they relate to the prolongation of the embargo against Iraq by keeping this issue open as long as possible. The position adopted by Kuwait is reflected in the extensive political and media campaign it is inciting around this matter in violation of the tripartite committee's decision to adhere to the principle of confidentiality in accordance with ICRC operational norms and practices.

9. One perplexing aspect of the position maintained by Kuwait and the coalition partners that are members of the tripartite committee is the demand that Iraq should provide substantive replies on the dossiers within a limited period of time. This demand is irreconcilable with the nature of the search for missing persons. If the situation was as they imagine it to be, there would not now be dossiers that still remain open on persons missing in wars that have long been over.

10. In its letter, the Kuwaiti Government claims that at times Iraq launches initiatives and appeals for an inter-Arab solution or for endeavours by particular countries with the aim of politicizing the issue of the missing persons.

This allegation is completely false. It is the Kuwaiti regime that is roaming the world, east and west alike, seeking mediation by one and all, and the underlying aim in doing so is clearly political and propagandistic. What Iraq has done, for humanitarian reasons, is to respond positively to all who have offered their good offices in helping to resolve this issue. It appears, however, that Iraq's responsiveness to such efforts has been contrary to the Kuwaiti regime's expectations and that the Kuwaiti regime has therefore rejected these efforts. It may be useful in this connection to quote from a statement made by an official of the Kuwaiti regime, Mr. Salim al-Sabah, Chairman of the "National Committee for Matters Relating to Missing Persons, Detainees and Prisoners of War", at the press conference he held at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 3 May 1995:

> "We decided that since it was an Arab issue we should approach the League of Arab States, since it was an Islamic issue we should approach the Organization of the Islamic Conference, since it was an Asian issue we should approach the Asian countries and since it was a humanitarian issue we should approach non-governmental organizations. We also approached the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and its Chairman, Mr. Soeharto, because we are all members of the Movement. I have myself met with many heads of

State and government and ministers for foreign affairs, and I have secured the support of all those with whom I have met."

The statement by this Kuwaiti official calls attention to the efforts made by his regime to politicize the issue of the missing persons and does not indicate an endeavour to resolve it. Had this regime been making a serious effort to resolve the situation, it would not have roamed the world in this fashion and then have found it too troublesome for its delegation to traverse the 28 kilometres separating the Iraqi border station and the Umm Qasr location at which the technical subcommittee was to have met for a serious discussion of the fate of the missing persons.

II. RETURN OF KUWAITI PROPERTY

1. The Kuwaiti letter in question characterizes Iraq's cooperation in this matter as "apparent and selective". This judgement is contrary to the facts set forth in the report of the Secretary-General circulated as document S/1994/243, which demonstrate Iraq's continuing cooperation in the return of property. Iraq has affirmed its readiness to return any item found and determined to belong to Kuwait, even if it is not included in the lists established by the United Nations coordinator for the return of property.

The hand-overs that have taken place since our letter of 25 May 1995 (S/1995/446) are as follows:

(a) On 9 July 1995 the hand-over of naval equipment was completed at Umm Qasr. The items handed over were as follows:

No.	Item	Quantity
1.	L90 landing craft	1
2.	L85 landing craft	1
3.	A1115 service craft (tug)	1
4.	Mechanical spare parts	
5.	Electrical spare parts and electronic devices	
6.	Dagaie electronic countermeasures station	1
7.	Engine hydraulic unit	1
8.	Sareco metal-plate cutter	1
9.	Naber model 3X5 electric furnace	1
10.	Horgalete stone furnace	1
11.	Smori device	1
12.	Brace	1
13.	Steam machine	1
14.	Dual electric silicon brushes	1
15.	Steam cleaner	1

No.	Item	Quantity
16.	Cylinder-grinding machine 2592	1
17.	Plane grinding machine No. 149002	1
18.	Large cradle	1
19.	1808 bending machine	1
20.	Honing machine 592531	1
21.	Electric diesel 915-1	1
22.	Cylinder regulator RM501011	1
23.	Battery charger	1
24.	Diesel cooler	1
25.	Smelting crucible	1
26.	German-made Hosch high-pressure fuel-pump gauge	1
27.	British-made Hartidy high-pressure fuel-pump gauge	1
28.	Mixer	1

(b) On 10 July 1995 a naval craft was handed over at buoy 6 at Umm Qasr.

(c) On 28 June 1995 an antique coffee-pot was handed over that had been found but was not included in the lists sent by the special coordinator.

2. The Kuwaiti letter states that the representative of Iraq to the "committee on the return of property" had said that the equipment that had been returned damaged had been brought from Kuwait in the same condition. This allegation shows great ignorance and contains a major distortion.

In the first place, there is no "committee" on the return of property but a "coordinator" for the return of property. We are surprised at the ignorance shown of the difference between a committee and a coordinator.

In the second place, the Kuwaiti letter appears to mock the intelligence of one and all by attributing to the representative of Iraq a statement that is untrue and then claiming that the statement is not in keeping with reason or logic.

III. OTHER MATTERS

The Kuwaiti letter finds fault with Iraq for its failure to address Security Council resolutions 706 (1991), 712 (1991) and 986 (1995) and tries to make a display of sympathy with the suffering of the people of Iraq, suffering that has been caused by the comprehensive embargo imposed on that people.

First, it must be stressed that the subject-matter of these resolutions has no connection, whether proximate or remote, with Kuwait and that the Kuwaiti regime's intrusion into that subject-matter does not in any way reflect good faith.

In another respect, sympathy for the suffering of the people of Iraq is not a slogan that has merely to be uttered in order to be believed by one and all but is rather a matter of actions taken and positions adopted. The Kuwaiti regime, for its part, unlike the Security Council resolutions themselves and despite their injustice, is calling for the maintenance of the embargo against Iraq until such time as its political regime is replaced. The official of the Kuwaiti regime to whom we referred above was asked at the press conference of 3 May 1995, "Do you believe that the issue of the missing persons is connected with paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991)?" He answered in a peremptory tone, "Yes, I certainly do."

How can someone who opposes the legal interpretation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) for the purpose of prolonging the embargo against the people of Iraq declare that he sympathizes with that people?

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/593
19 July 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the violations of Iraqi national airspace committed by United States aircraft in order to carry out reconnaissance and cause provocation continued over the period 1-10 July 1995.

1 July 1995

1. Northern region: 18 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Zakho, Dohuk, Aqrah and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 14 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Qal'at Salih, Samawah, Salman, Shanafiyah, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

3. At 1500 hours on 1 July 1995, aggressor aircraft dropped four heat flares in Ninawa Governorate.

2 July 1995

1. Northern region: 11 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Aqrah, Tall Afar, Sinjar and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 62 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Busayyah, Chabaish, Artawi and Shanafiyah.

3 July 1995

1. Northern region: 13 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 43 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Jalibah, Artawi and Busayyah.

3. At 0750 hours on 3 July 1995, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. It left in the direction of Kuwait at 0855 hours.

4 July 1995

1. Southern region: 31 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Basra, Qurnah, Salman, Lasaf, Shanafiyah, Shatrah, Jalibah and Busayyah.

2. At 0700 hours on 4 July 1995, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. It left in the direction of Kuwait at 0745 hours.

5 July 1995

1. Northern region: 19 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 37 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Shanafiyah, Busayyah and Salman.

3. At 0735 hours on 5 July 1995, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. It left in the direction of Kuwait at 0900 hours.

6 July 1995

1. Northern region: 21 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

2. Southern region: 33 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Jalibah, Artawi and Busayyah.

3. On 6 July 1995, two United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 0750 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 0915 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1125 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1235 hours.

4. On 6 July 1995, aggressor aircraft dropped two heat flares in the Tar area of Dhi Qar Governorate.

7 July 1995

Southern region: 64 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Artawi, Jalibah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Nasiriyah, Samawah and Rumaythah.

8 July 1995

1. Southern region: 71 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Salman, Jalibah, Busayyah and Artawi.

2. At 0925 hours on 8 July 1995, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. It left in the direction of Kuwait at 1215 hours.

9 July 1995

1. Northern region: 21 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 63 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Qurnah, Samawah, Jalibah, Artawi and Busayyah.

3. At 1006 hours on 9 July 1995, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. It left in the direction of Kuwait at 1217 hours.

10 July 1995

1. Northern region: 11 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Zakho, Amadiyah, Ayn Zalah, Dohuk, Mosul and Aqrah.

2. Southern region: 72 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Artawi, Qurnah and Chabaish.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/302
S/1995/594
21 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Item 114 (c) of the preliminary list*
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS AND REPORTS OF SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS AND REPRESENTATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 21 July 1995 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 20 July 1995 from His Excellency Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to you (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under item 114 (c) of the preliminary list and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bratislav DJORDJEVIC
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/50/50/Rev.1.

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ANNEX

Letter dated 20 July 1995 from His Excellency Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to draw your attention to the events in the region of Gorski Kotar, part of the Republic of Croatia, with the majority Serbian population in eight local communities (175 villages) living outside the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs).

Over the past three years, the Serbs in Gorski Kotar have been exposed to the threat of forcible mobilization and are in fact being forcibly mobilized, to which the international community continues to turn a blind eye.

These acts of the Croatian authorities constitute a blatant violation of the oral agreement reached between the Serbs and the Croatian authorities in August 1991 on the maintenance of the status quo in the area of Gorski Kotar pending a general political solution. These acts are also contrary to the agreement signed by the representatives of the Serb and Croatian authorities on 6 July 1992, which, inter alia, envisages that the Croatian authorities will not mobilize the Serbs from this region into the Croatian military.

The first threats of the Croatian authorities to mobilize all Serbs aged between 16 and 60, may I recall, date back to January 1992.

On his visit to the municipality of Dreznica on 26 May 1992, Croatian Interior Minister Josip Boljkovac requested a list of all Serbs aged between 16 and 60 eligible for military service. Mobilization of Serbs was subsequently suspended after they complained to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

The mobilization in the villages of Brestovac and Vitunja of 8 June 1992 and in all other Serbian villages of 20 June 1992 was also suspended after the complaint of Serbs to representatives of UNPROFOR and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM).

But already on 29 August 1992, five Serbs from Dreznica were forcibly mobilized. On 1 November 1992, 20 young men, 16 years old, from Jasenak, Srpske Moravice, Gomirje and Dreznica were summoned for military duty, while a number of Serbs were also mobilized on 28 December 1992.

All Serbs eligible for military service in all eight Serbian communities refused the summons for military duty they were sent on 9 February and 12 March 1993 and the mobilization was called off after an urgent intercession by Serb representatives with UNPROFOR and ECMM. However, the Croatian authorities did forcibly mobilize those Serbs who had found shelter in Gorski Kotar as refugees.

In 1994, the Croatian authorities continued the forcible mobilization of Serbs by abducting them from their homes and places of work and by checking their identity in streets and on public roads. On 13 August 1994, for instance, all Serbs eligible for military service from Gomirje, Srpske Moravice, Jasenak, Dreznica and Ponikve were forcibly mobilized and sent to the firing line to fight their fellow Serbs from the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The mobilization led to a mass exodus and the absconding of Serbs in the woods and mountains of Gorski Kotar.

Since 6 May 1995, the Serbs from the areas of Srpske Moravice, Gomirje, Jasenak, Dreznica, Gornje and Donje Dubrave are being forcibly mobilized all over again. They are being taken to serve in the units of the Croatian Defence Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina or the units of the Croatian regular forces in the territory of former Bosnia and Herzegovina. So far, all Serbs eligible for military service from Brestovac and Vitunja have been mobilized; 10 Serbs from Musulinski Potok; 15 Serbs from Gomirje and Srpske Moravice and 5 Serbs from Dreznica, Jasenak, Gornje and Donje Dubrave. The mobilization is being carried out at night by breaking into people's homes and with the brutal use of force.

These instances provide abundant evidence that the Croatian authorities are carrying out a continued and forcible mobilization of Serbs in this region, and that they have stepped up these actions recently despite existing agreements.

I wish to recall that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia informed the United Nations of these problems on two occasions, as well as the generally very difficult situation of 6,000 Serbs living in Gorski Kotar in the immediate vicinity of the war zone. They are exposed to enormous pressure and the Croatian authorities continue to violate their basic human and national rights.

Therefore, the Yugoslav Government views the acts of forcible mobilization in the context of the continued efforts of the Croatian authorities to compel the Serbian population to leave their ancestral homes and to ethnically cleanse this region, as was the case with western Slavonia (UNPA Sector West). For that purpose, Croatia has deployed 20,000 troops towards the Serbian villages in Gorski Kotar with 35 tanks and 20 armoured personnel carriers, while Tomislav Mercep men, notorious for their mass crimes against the Serbs in western Slavonia, are quartered at Dreznica and Jasenak.

At this difficult juncture for the Serbian people in Gorski Kotar, I call on you to do everything within your capacities to stop the forcible mobilization of Serbs. Your actions, I am confident, will help preserve peace in Gorski Kotar and facilitate the overall peace efforts of the international community.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/595
19 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period 21 January to 19 July 1995)

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 974 (1995) of 30 January 1995, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of six months, until 31 July 1995. It covers developments since my last report of 23 January 1995 (S/1995/66).

Organizational matters

2. As of July 1995, UNIFIL comprised 4,967 troops, from Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Norway and Poland (see annex I to the present report). In addition, UNIFIL employed 524 civilian staff, of whom 159 were recruited internationally and 365 locally. The deployment of UNIFIL is shown on the map at annex II.

3. Major-General Trond Furuhovde of Norway ended his tour of duty as Force Commander on 23 February 1995. Major-General Stanislaw F. Wozniak of Poland succeeded him on 1 April 1995.

4. UNIFIL was assisted in the performance of its tasks by 59 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). These unarmed officers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon and are under the operational control of the Force Commander of UNIFIL. They man five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line. They also operate five mobile teams in that part of the area of operation which is controlled by Israel.

5. The Government of Norway has informed me of its decision to withdraw the Norwegian maintenance company by November 1995. I am consulting Governments with a view to its replacement.

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6. I regret to report that a Norwegian and a Nepalese soldier have died as a result of vehicle accidents. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 204 members of the Force have died: 76 as a result of firing or bomb explosions, 84 in accidents and 44 from other causes. A total of 314 have been wounded by firing or by mine or bomb explosions.

7. UNIFIL maintained close contact and cooperation with the Lebanese authorities on matters of mutual concern. Those authorities provided valuable assistance in connection with the rotation of troops and the increasing volume of logistic activities in Beirut. The Lebanese army was particularly helpful in defusing confrontations with armed elements. The Force continued to cooperate with the Lebanese gendarmerie on matters pertaining to the maintenance of law and order.

8. In previous reports, I mentioned difficulties that had arisen as a result of the non-payment by the Government of Lebanon of rents accumulated since 1987 for land and premises used by UNIFIL. The Lebanese authorities have recently begun to pay those rents. It is hoped that the owners will soon be fully reimbursed and that payments will be made at regular intervals thereafter.

Financial aspects

9. By its resolution 49/226 of 23 December 1994, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the operation of the Force at a rate not to exceed $11,234,500 gross ($10,870,830 net) per month for a period of up to six months from 1 August 1995, should the Security Council decide to extend the Force's mandate beyond 31 July 1995. This authorization is based on an average strength of 5,015 and continuation of existing responsibilities.

10. As at 30 June 1995, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account amounted to $211.1 million. The total unpaid assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations at that date amounted to $1.8 billion.

Streamlining

11. In my last report (S/1995/66, para. 6), I indicated my intention to pursue possibilities of streamlining UNIFIL and achieving economies in the areas of maintenance and logistic support. The Security Council endorsed this intention in its resolution 974 (1995). Following a detailed review, Major-General Wozniak, the Force Commander, has proposed a slimming-down of his headquarters by 20 per cent, the consolidation of engineer support in one unit, and small reductions of varying size in the infantry battalions. These measures would result in a reduction in the overall strength of the Force by 10 per cent. They will not affect its operational capacity. I have decided to accept this proposal, subject to the Security Council's concurrence.

12. The streamlining is to be put into effect in connection with the regular rotation of contingents and should be largely completed in the spring of 1996. While the budget for 1996/1997 has not yet been completed, at this stage it can

be stated that the proposed reduction represents a direct savings in personnel costs of approximately $10 million per year. I have asked General Wozniak to continue his efforts to achieve further economies.

Situation in the area of operation

13. Israel continued to control in southern Lebanon an area manned by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese de facto forces (DFF), the so-called "South Lebanon Army". The boundaries of the Israeli-controlled area (ICA) have not been clearly defined but are determined de facto by the forward IDF/DFF positions. It includes territory adjacent to the armistice demarcation line, parts of the Fijian, Nepalese, Irish, and Finnish battalion sectors and the entire Norwegian battalion sector, as well as sizeable areas to the north of UNIFIL's area of operation. Within the ICA, IDF/DFF maintained 71 military positions, as shown on the map at annex II. The map also indicates where the ICA extends beyond the limits of UNIFIL's area of operation.

14. Within the ICA, Israel maintained, in addition to DFF, a civil administration and security service. Movement between the ICA and the rest of Lebanon was strictly controlled; crossings were closed frequently causing considerable difficulties for the inhabitants. The ICA remained economically dependent on Israel. An estimated 3,000 jobs in Israel were held by Lebanese from the ICA. Access to such jobs was controlled by DFF and the security services. There were again reports of forced recruitment into DFF, including the recruitment of persons under the age of 18.

15. UNIFIL observed 129 operations against IDF/DFF by armed elements who have proclaimed their resistance against Israel's occupation (8 in the latter part of January, 30 in February, 18 in March, 18 in April, 20 in May, 24 in June and 11 in the first half of July), as compared to 87 in the previous period. There were also numerous reports of attacks against IDF/DFF positions north of the Litani River. Most of the attacks were carried out by a group known as the Islamic Resistance. In their operations, the armed elements employed roadside bombs, rockets, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles.

16. IDF/DFF continued their own attacks and retaliatory firing against armed elements employing artillery, mortars, tanks and aircraft. UNIFIL recorded over 16,500 artillery, mortar and tank rounds fired by IDF/DFF. IDF has stepped up its night-time ambushes and long-range patrolling and increasingly made use of assault helicopters. While air attacks were less frequent than in previous periods, flights by Israeli military aircraft over Lebanese territory continued. Since February 1995, Israel has imposed restrictions on the movement of Lebanese fishermen in Lebanese territorial waters off the coast of south Lebanon and has enforced these restrictions by naval vessels. At times, this involved firing at fishing boats and temporary detention of Lebanese fishermen.

17. The period under review was marked by the number of exchanges in which civilians on both sides were killed or injured. These exchanges were sparked by indiscriminate fire or the targeting of populated areas by IDF/DFF, followed by the firing of rockets into Israel, for which the Islamic Resistance claimed responsibility. In some instances, armed elements launched their attacks from

the vicinity of villages in UNIFIL's area of deployment, drawing retaliatory fire.

18. UNIFIL reported the following details:

(a) On 31 March, rockets fired from an Israeli helicopter killed a member of the Islamic Resistance as he was travelling in a car in the Ghanaian battalion sector. The same day, rockets were fired into Israel, killing one civilian and injuring several others;

(b) On 4 May, retaliatory firing by IDF/DFF killed a Lebanese civilian and wounded more than seven in Jarjouaa, north of UNIFIL's area of operation. The next morning, rockets were fired toward Qiryat Shemona, wounding an Israeli civilian;

(c) On 30 May, IDF/DFF fired six mortar rounds into Shaqra in the Irish battalion sector, killing a 13-year-old girl and seriously wounding two other girls. The next day, rockets were fired into Israel towards Qiryat Shemona and Western Galilee, causing minor damage;

(d) On 14 June, IDF/DFF shelling in response to an attack from the vicinity of Shaqra wounded four civilians in that village. The next day, rockets were fired into Israel, wounding eight Israeli civilians near Maalot. On that day a rocket fired from an Israeli helicopter killed a 15-year-old boy and wounded his 5-year-old brother at Siddiqin;

(e) On 22 June, IDF/DFF, responding to an attack from the vicinity of Shaqra, killed a 19-year-old girl and wounded her older brother in Shaqra. The following day, rockets were fired into Israel, killing a French citizen and wounding eight other civilians north of the coastal town of Nahariya;

(f) On 8 July, an IDF tank fired fléchette anti-personnel shells towards a house in Nabatiyeh Fawqa, killing three children and wounding four others. The next day, rockets were fired into Israel; no damage or casualties were reported.

19. I have repeatedly expressed my concern at these actions and urged the parties to exercise restraint. In the field, UNIFIL maintained close contact with both sides, urging them to respect the non-combatant status of civilians.

20. UNIFIL continued its efforts to prevent armed elements from using its area for hostile purposes. At times, this led to friction at UNIFIL checkpoints, followed by harassment and threats directed at members of the Force. Such cases were generally resolved through negotiations, often with the help of Lebanese army officers.

21. There were 51 instances of firing at or close to UNIFIL positions and personnel by armed elements, compared to a total of 17 during the previous period. Such firings were reported to the Lebanese army and, where possible, protested to the leadership of the groups involved. On 19 March, a Nepalese soldier was seriously injured when an anti-personnel mine exploded at a newly established observation post at Yatar. A similar mine was found at the same location a few days later.

22. There were 208 instances of firing by IDF/DFF at or close to UNIFIL positions and personnel. All such firings were protested to the Israeli authorities.

23. As in the past, UNIFIL detonated mines, roadside bombs and unexploded remnants of war and dismantled ordnance of various types in the area of deployment. A total of 105 such controlled explosions were carried out.

24. UNIFIL continued to extend humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in the form of medical care, essential supplies and engineering work and repairs to buildings damaged as a result of hostilities. UNIFIL personnel also escorted farmers so that they could work their fields which are within range of IDF/DFF positions and assisted in putting out fires set off by firing by IDF/DFF. In addition, equipment or services for schools and social services were provided from resources made available by troop-contributing Governments. UNIFIL helped carry out a school project supported financially by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and assisted the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its South Lebanon Emergency Rehabilitation Programme. The Force cooperated closely on these matters with the Lebanese authorities, United Nations agencies and programmes operating in Lebanon, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations.

25. UNIFIL battalion medical centres and mobile teams provided care to civilians at a rate of 2,500 per month. A French contingent team provided medical care to the inhabitants of villages in the western part of the ICA.

26. On 16 April, the Israeli authorities deported to Lebanon two Palestinians who had just been released from prison. They were denied entry by the Lebanese authorities and subsequently turned to UNIFIL. Since 18 April, the two men have been accommodated at UNIFIL headquarters. Efforts continue to arrange passage to a country or territory that would be willing to accept them.

Observations

27. The situation in southern Lebanon, which continues to be tense and volatile, has remained essentially unchanged and the decisions of the Security Council contained in resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and subsequent resolutions, including most recently resolution 974 (1995), remain unfulfilled. Israel has maintained its occupation of parts of south Lebanon, where the Israeli army and its Lebanese auxiliary continued to be targets of attacks by groups that have proclaimed their resistance to the occupation.

28. Lebanon's position is described in a letter that the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to me on 10 July 1995 (S/1995/554). In the same letter, the Permanent Representative informed me of his Government's decision to request the Security Council to extend UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months.

29. Israel has outlined its position with regard to the situation in southern Lebanon in a letter that the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United

Nations addressed to me on 1 August 1994 (S/1994/915) and confirmed in a letter of 18 January 1995 (S/1995/58).

30. Since my last report, the level of hostilities in the area has increased. Of particular concern is the number of civilians who have been killed or injured. I have repeatedly expressed my concern at the targeting of civilians and have urged the parties to exercise restraint. I am also conscious of the risk of escalation that is inherent in these exchanges.

31. UNIFIL continued to make every effort to limit the conflict and to protect the inhabitants from the hostilities. The Force carried out an active programme of patrolling throughout its area of deployment in order to provide a measure of protection to the villages and to farmers working in the fields.

32. Although there has been no progress towards the implementation of UNIFIL's mandate, the Force's contribution to stability in the area and the protection it is able to afford the inhabitants remain important. I therefore recommend that the Security Council accept the Lebanese Government's request and extend UNIFIL's mandate for another period of six months, that is, until 31 January 1996.

33. In making this recommendation, I must again draw attention to the serious shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to some $211.1 million. This represents money owed to Member States that contribute the troops who make up the Force. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears.

34. With the concurrence of the Security Council, I intend to carry out the streamlining outlined in paragraphs 11 and 12 above.

35. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Major-General Stanislaw F. Wozniak, the Force Commander, and to all the men and women under his command for the manner in which they have carried out their difficult and often dangerous task. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.

Annex I

Composition of UNIFIL

Fiji	UNIFIL headquarters	10	
	Infantry battalion	594	
	Force Mobile Reserve	34	
	Military police	8	646
Finland	UNIFIL headquarters	12	
	Infantry battalion	478	
	Force Mobile Reserve	19	
	Military police	9	518
France	UNIFIL headquarters	13	
	Composite unit (maintenance element and defence company)	245	
	Military police	3	261
Ghana	UNIFIL headquarters	23	
	Infantry battalion (including engineer company)	719	
	Force Mobile Reserve	35	
	Military police	7	
	Camp command	2	786
Ireland	UNIFIL headquarters	37	
	Infantry battalion	567	
	Headquarters camp command	27	
	Force Mobile Reserve	16	
	Military police	12	659
Italy	UNIFIL headquarters	5	
	Helicopter unit	37	
	Military police	2	44
Nepal	UNIFIL headquarters	7	
	Infantry battalion	628	
	Force Mobile Reserve	29	
	Military police	5	669
Norway	UNIFIL headquarters	25	
	Infantry battalion	595	
	Maintenance company	155	
	Force Mobile Reserve	33	
	Military police	14	822

Poland	UNIFIL headquarters	19	
	Logistic battalion	329	
	Engineer company	130	
	Medical unit	70	
	Force Mobile Reserve	4	
	Military police	10	562
Total			4 967


وزع بعثة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
في تموز/يوليه ١٩٩٥
1995年7月联黎部队的部署情形
UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JULY 1995
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL EN JULLIET 1995
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ИЮЛЬ 1995
DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN JULIO DE 1995
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
LEBAN
ISRAEL
ŞŪR (TYRE)
TRANSIT BASE
NAQOURA
FIJIBATT
NEPBATT
FINBATT
GHANBATT
IRISHBAT
HQ UNIFIL
LOG POLAND
LOG FRANCE
ITALY
MP COMPOSITE
POLAND
OGL
HQ FIJI
HQ NEPAL
HQ FINLAND
HQ IRELAND
POLAND
GHANA
FMR+
HIN (OGL)
LAB (OGL)
Aş Sarafand
Anşār
Az Zrārīyah
Kasmiyah
Litāni
Burj Rahhāl
Bidyās
Hallusiyah
at Tahta
Dayr Qānūn an Nahr
'Abbasiyah
Tayr Filsayl
Shhūr
Humayri
Shabriha
Tūrā
Marub
Arzūn
Srifā
Tayr Dibbah
Bārish
Bāfliyah
Ma'rakah
Yanuh
Burj ash Shamāli
Al Bazūriyah
Wādi Jilu
Tayr Zibna
Ar Rashidiyah
Jwayyā
Ra's al 'Ayn
Ayn B'āl
Dayr Qānūn
Hannawiyah
Qānā
Bir as Sanāsil
Dayr Ntār
Al Qulaylah
Ramādiyah
Al Bayyadi
Aş Şiddīqīn
Rishknaniyah
Al Yatun
Al Hinniyah
Kafrā
Ḥāris
Buyūt as Sayyid
Zibqīn
Tallet Huqban
Haddātha
Al Bayyādah
Majdal Zūn
Yātar
Sribbin
Ra's ad Durayjot
Shamā
Rshāf
At Tīri
Jabal Bāsil
Tayr Harfa
Bayt Lif
Shihin
Dibil
BINI JUHA
Naqoura
'Almā ash Sha'b
Yārin
Ayta ash Sha'b
Ra's an Naqurah (Rosh Haniqra)
Hanita
Shelomi
Rumaysh
Elon
0 1 2 3 4 5 km
0 1 2 3 mi
The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
Map No. 3000 Rev. 38 UNITED NATIONS
July 1995
180
170
160°00'E
35° 20'
33° 20'
33° 10'
35° 10'
310°00'N
300
290
280°00'N


Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section
200
210
220000E
35° 30'
35° 40'
310000N
300
290
290000N
33° 20'
Ouardiyé
Aichiyé
Habbūsh
Kaoukaba
Mourhbiyé
Mazra'at Ouazaiyé
Blāte
HQ
NORWAY
Hasbaiya
AN NABATIYAH AT' TAHTĀ
Mahmoudiye
Kafer Roumane
MARJAYOUN
Ebel es Saqi
Rāchaiya el Foukhar
Chebaā
Kafer Tibnite
Teil Dibbine
NORBATT
Arnaoûn
El Qlaiaā
Kafer Choûba
Qa'qa'iyat al Jisr
Chateau de Beaufort
El Khiām
El Mérj
KHIAM (OGL)
Zawiar ash Sharqiyah
Akiya
Yohmor
Litani
Deir Mimess
Khoube
Ett Taibe
Al Qantarah
Kafer Kela
Metulla
Majdal Shams
Qabrikha
Misgav'am
Tulin
Bani Hayyan
Kefar Gil'adi
As Sawwanah
Khirbat Silm
Markabe
QIRYAT SHEMONA
Majdal Silm
Houle
Safad
Shaqrah
Ramin
Bra'shit
Meiss ej Jebel
Zutt
Kūnin
Blida
'Aynātā
Aytarun
Mārun ar Ra's
RAS (OGL)
Ramot Naftali
'Alma
Kerem Ben Zimra
0 1 2 3 4 5 km
0 1 2 3 mi
مركز مراقبة
觀察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación
نقطة تفتيش
檢查站
Check point
Point de controle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de control
قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
База
Base
موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional
الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter-Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza
حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte
وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
Unité libanaise
Ливанские подразделения
Unidad libanesa
موقع لقوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية و/أو «جيش جنوب لبنان»
以色列国防军和(或)"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israeli Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position
Position des Forces de défense israéliennes et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"
Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"
الامتداد الشمالي المنطقة التي تسيطر عليها إسرائيل
以色列控制地区向北延伸部分
Northward extension of Israeli controlled area
Extension vers le nord de la zone contrôlée par Israel
Северная часть территории, контролируемой Израилем
Extensión septentrional de la zona controlada por Israel
المساحة التقريبية لما يقع تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية من منطقة عمل قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区内在以色列控制下地区概况
Approximate area under Israeli control in UNIFIL area of operation
Périmètre approximatif de la zone sous contrôle israelien dans la zone d'opérations de la FINUL
Примерный район в зоне действия ВСООНЛ, находящийся под контролем Израиля
Area aproximada bajo control israeli dentro de la zone de operaciones de la Fuerza

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/596
19 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 JULY 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I wish to inform you that the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), meeting in its sixty-second session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 21 to 23 June 1995 adopted resolution CM/Res. 1587 (LXII) on the crisis between the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France. This resolution was subsequently endorsed by the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU. Please find herewith a copy of the said resolution.

I have the honour to request you to have the resolution circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Salim Ahmed SALIM

95-21651 (E) 210795 240795

/...

Annex

[Original: English, French and Arabic]

Resolution on the crisis between the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Sixty-second Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 21 to 23 June 1995,

Guided by the principles and objectives of the Charters of the United Nations and the OAU calling on Member States to settle their disputes through peaceful means and to respect the independence of all Member States and pose no threat to their sovereignty, territorial integrity and the security of their people,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on Libya's dispute with the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France,

Having heard the statement made by the Chairman of the OAU Ministerial Committee on the said dispute set up by resolution CM/Res. 1566 (LXI) at the Sixty-first Ordinary Session of Council as well as that of the Head of Libyan delegation,

Recalling the statement of 6 December 1991, issued by the Organization of African Unity on the American and British threats against the Great Jamahiriya as well as his appeal to the parties concerned to exercise self-restraint, seek a peaceful solution through dialogue and other peaceful means in consonance with the principle of international law and respect of the sovereignty of States, and refrain from any act that may impede the legal process,

Taking into consideration the position of the Great Jamahiriya which condemns all forms of terrorism and denounces those who resort to terrorism or encourage it as well as Libya's willingness to cooperate with every regional or international effort aimed at solving this problem,

Expressing its appreciation for the positive initiative of the Great Jamahiriya to settle the dispute, its acceptance of Security Council resolution 731 (1992), its request to the United Nations Secretary-General to establish a mechanism to implement the said resolution and its complete readiness to cooperate within the initiatives and proposals it offered,

Greatly concerned about the human and material damage that the Libyan Arab people and those of the neighbouring States are suffering as a result of the unjust sanctions imposed on Libya pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993),

Noting with regret, the disregard of the three western countries for all successive resolutions adopted by the Regional Organizations expressing their support for a just settlement of the dispute,

Reaffirming the serious danger posed by the Lockerbie affair to peace and security of Africa, particularly the North African and Mediterranean region, if the crisis is not resolved to the satisfaction of all the parties,

Recalling all pertinent Statements, Communiques and Resolutions of the Council of Ministers, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government as well as the Central Organ on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution on the issue,

Appreciative of the positive initiative taken by the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to find a settlement to the crisis based on respect for the sovereignty and international law and its acceptance of Security Council resolution 731 (1992),

Continually concerned about the suffering of the Libyan Arab people and those of the neighbouring States as a result of the unjust sanctions imposed on the country with all its repercussions on African immigrant workers in Libya:

1. Expresses appreciation for the declaration issued by the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, condemning terrorism and expressing its readiness to fully cooperate with any party in combating terrorism within the international effort and commends the responsible and restrained manner in which Libya is dealing with this crisis;

2. Expresses its grave concern over the escalation of this crisis and the threat to impose further sanctions or use force as a method in dealing with other States in violation of the Charters of the OAU and the United Nations as well as international laws and norms;

3. Reaffirms its solidarity with the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and calls on all the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could lead to escalation of tensions, thus causing Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the neighbouring States further damage;

4. Once again expresses its appreciation of the readiness of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to peacefully settle the dispute and cooperate to that end in initiating meaningful dialogue with the parties to the conflict;

5. Commends the work done by the OAU Ministerial Committee on the dispute and requests it to continue coordinating efforts and initiatives in opening channels for dialogue with assistance from the Secretary-General so as to secure a peaceful and just settlement to the dispute and to report to Council as appropriate;

6. Deplores the maintenance of sanctions against Libya despite the efforts and initiatives of the various regional and international organizations aimed at finding a peaceful and just solution to the crisis in accordance with the international law;

7. Reiterates its appeal to the Security Council to reconsider its resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) so as to lift the current embargo on Libya;

8. Calls on all parties concerned to positively respond to the initiatives for dialogue and negotiations to secure a peaceful settlement to the crisis in conformity with Article 33 of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter which calls for the settlement of disputes through negotiations, mediation and legal procedures in conformity with international law and calls for a fair trial of the two suspects in a neutral country to be agreed upon by all the parties concerned;

9. Calls for international support, notably from the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, for Libya in its legitimate quest for a seat on the Security Council and expresses its strong opposition to any move to deny the Security Council seat to Libya on account of the Lockerbie dispute.